IN most legal systems, courts are reluctant to judge a plaintiff by his past. But when a litigant drags a sitting Prime Minister into a politically explosive civil suit — while facing his own serious criminal charges — credibility is not a side issue. It is central to public confidence, constitutional integrity, and the fair administration of justice.

The civil suit by Muhammed Yusoff Rawther against the Prime Minister is being treated by some as a routine tort claim. It is not. The factual and legal context surrounding the Plaintiff is so compromised, so politically timed, and so institutionally dangerous that it cannot be treated as an ordinary dispute between private parties.

This is not about discrediting the man to avoid the claim. It is about asking a fundamental question: can Malaysia’s constitutional system afford to allow its courts to be used as a platform for someone facing a credibility collapse and awaiting a criminal verdict?

Who Is the Plaintiff — and Why It Matters

Let’s start with the facts:

Yusoff Rawther alleged in December 2019 that the then non-sitting Prime Minister had committed sexual misconduct in October 2018.

He lodged a police report and made a statutory declaration. The matter was investigated, and in January 2020, the Attorney General’s Chambers issued a “No Further Action” (NFA) classification due to lack of evidence.

In 2021, Yusoff filed a civil suit reviving the same allegations — now not subject to the prosecutorial standard, but subject to the optics of litigation.

In 2024, Yusoff was arrested and charged with trafficking over 300 grams of cannabis and possessing two imitation firearms. He is now on remand at Sungai Buloh Prison, and the High Court is scheduled to deliver its verdict on 12 June 2025.

This is the same individual who is demanding discovery, trial, and cross-examination against the sitting Prime Minister.

And some insist this is just “a private matter”?

Credibility Isn’t a Distraction — It’s Constitutional Risk

In politically sensitive constitutional litigation, the character and conduct of the parties cannot be ignored. Especially when the lawsuit:

 Was filed after the criminal authorities deemed it legally meritless,

 Is being revived in civil court for maximum reputational damage,

 Comes from a source who is currently on trial for serious crimes, and

 Is being used to drag the head of government into court during a volatile political period.

This is not a neutral plaintiff with a clean slate. This is someone with a pending criminal case, weak evidentiary grounding, and a political context that stinks of manipulation.

To let such a person turn the Judiciary into a stage for civil prosecution-by-proxy is not justice. It is institutional recklessness.

The Reference Asks the Right Question: Should the Courts Entertain This?

The Prime Minister’s constitutional reference does not ask the Federal Court to judge Yusoff’s character. It asks:

Whether the Constitution requires courts to conduct a threshold inquiry in such cases — especially when the credibility of the plaintiff and timing of the suit raise constitutional concerns;

 Whether allowing this suit to proceed without filtering its public interest consequences violates Articles 5(1) and 8(1);

 Whether such politically timed litigation offends the separation of powers or basic structure of the Constitution, by paralysing the Executive through public trial by discredited proxy.

These are constitutional questions — not personal attacks. They go to the heart of whether civil litigation, like any process, can be abused when launched by compromised actors with political motives.

The Judiciary Must Consider Who Is Using Its Platform

A plaintiff facing serious criminal charges and reputational collapse is not entitled to a blank cheque to bring down a Prime Minister through civil claims. That is not justice. That is systemic hijack.

If the courts are blind to who uses their process, they risk becoming vehicles for strategic litigation by discredited figures — providing legitimacy to suits that the public rightly sees as suspicious.

The rule of law demands more than equal access. It demands proper gatekeeping.

Conclusion: Constitutional Protection Is Not Just for the Accused — It’s Also from the Accuser

The Constitution must protect democratic institutions from being destabilised by litigants who use the court not for justice, but for spectacle. Yusoff’s personal and legal circumstances cannot be dismissed as “irrelevant background.” They are essential context for understanding why the Prime Minister’s reference is not only lawful — it is necessary.

A legal system that allows the discredited to weaponise the courts against the elected will of the people has stopped serving justice. It has started serving chaos.

The Judiciary must not let that happen.

*The author is an experienced legal practitioner who frequently engages in legal discourse